Information, Social, and Socio-Business Background in Poland Regarding Ukrainians

1. Purpose of the study

The study was conducted to assess the current dynamics of public perception of Ukrainians in Poland and to identify changes across four interrelated environments:

1. The Polish-language digital information space.
2. Public reaction to xenophobia and ethnically motivated violence.
3. The institutional rhetoric of Polish authorities.
4. Polish-Ukrainian economic and business relations.

Additionally, reports of crimes presumably motivated by national or ethnic hostility were analyzed, as well as the nature of the response by police and prosecutors.

The study is not a representative sociological survey of the Polish population. It records changes in the publicly available information field and makes it possible to identify dominant discursive, institutional, and socio-economic trends.

2. Monitoring methodology

Monitoring covered open Polish-language content posted on Facebook, X, TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, and the Wykop platform.

The research corpus included:

1. Public posts and user comments.
2. Discussions under publications by Polish media outlets.
3. Descriptions of and comments on video materials.
4. Publications by socio-political pages and public groups.
5. User-generated content mentioning Ukrainians, Ukraine, migration, employment, social support, crime, historical memory, and interethnic relations.

A combined methodology was applied, including quantitative content analysis, qualitative discourse analysis, and manual verification of publications with potential markers of hate speech.

The quantitative stage included:

1. Searching for mentions using a Polish-language semantic core.
2. Deduplication of repeated publications and publications that were distributed automatically.
3. Thematic clustering of messages.
4. Determination of the overall tonality of the content.
5. Classification of messages as negative, neutral, or positive.
6. Comparison of the intensity of aggressive rhetoric with the previous period of internal observation.
7. Recording the dynamics of user counter-reaction.

The qualitative stage included:

1. Identification of direct ethnic insults.
2. Detection of collective blame directed at Ukrainians.
3. Recording of dehumanizing language.
4. Analysis of calls for discrimination, social isolation, or violence.
5. Distinguishing between political criticism, historical debate, and ethnic aggression.
6. Analysis of counter-speech aimed at defending Ukrainians and delegitimizing xenophobic behavior.

The methodology also included observation of digital platform actions: removal of publications, blocking of accounts, visibility restrictions, labeling of materials, and reduction of their algorithmic distribution.

3. Summary of findings

In the monitored segment of the Polish-language digital space, a relative discursive de-escalation was recorded in July 2026.

Open anti-Ukrainian aggression has not disappeared, but the most radical forms of ethnically hostile content became less dominant in the observed corpus.

At the same time, the visibility of counter-speech increased. Polish users more frequently publicly condemned nationally motivated insults, collective blame directed at Ukrainians, and the use of violence based on origin.

At the institutional level, argumentation presenting Ukrainians not only as recipients of social support but also as a significant part of Poland's labor market, tax system, and economic infrastructure became more visible.

At the same time, the number of reports of probable hate crimes continues to grow. This points to a divergence between information-level de-escalation and the actual risks of physical or verbal aggression.

In the business environment, political tension has not yet led to a mass discontinuation of cooperation. The main consequence is increased uncertainty and the deferral of new investment decisions.

4. Dynamics of the information background

Over the period under review, the monitored corpus showed a relative decline in the intensity of openly aggressive anti-Ukrainian rhetoric.

The most notable decreases were recorded in the following categories:

1. Direct ethnic insults.
2. Dehumanizing language.
3. Generalized accusations against all Ukrainians for the actions of individuals.
4. Calls for collective punishment.
5. Public justification of physical violence.
6. Demands to restrict human rights solely on the basis of Ukrainian origin.

At the same time, a significant volume of negative content persists in relation to social policy, migration, budget expenditures, historical memory, and current political relations between Poland and Ukraine.

Not all critical rhetoric can be classified as hate speech. Therefore, the study distinguished between criticism of the policies of the Polish or Ukrainian state and hostility toward specific individuals on the basis of their nationality.

The current dynamic should be characterized not as a shift toward stably positive perception of Ukrainians, but as a limited decline in the public legitimacy of the most radical forms of xenophobic rhetoric.

5. Growth of counter-speech and societal self-regulation

One of the most pronounced trends of July was an increase in the share of public messages directed against xenophobia and ethnically motivated violence.

Polish users more frequently:

1. Condemned attacks on Ukrainians.
2. Refused to endorse collective blame.
3. Pointed out the impermissibility of transferring political conflicts onto ordinary citizens.
4. Distinguished between historical disputes and individual responsibility.
5. Defended Ukrainian workers, women, children, and families.
6. Publicly criticized aggressive behavior on the part of their own fellow citizens.

From an analytical standpoint, this process can be defined as normative counter-mobilization.

Normative counter-mobilization refers to the growth of public resistance to attempts to normalize discrimination and violence against a particular national group.

At the same time, a mechanism of horizontal societal correction is emerging. The restriction of xenophobic rhetoric occurs not only through the actions of state institutions and digital platforms, but also through the reaction of the participants of online communities themselves.

Counter-speech performs several functions:

1. Reduces the social acceptability of hate speech.
2. Increases the reputational costs for authors of aggressive publications.
3. Impedes the normalization of ethnically motivated violence.
4. Builds public support for those affected.
5. Creates an alternative interpretive framework for conflict-related events.

At the same time, the growth of counter-speech does not mean an automatic reduction in the number of people holding negative attitudes toward Ukrainians. It shows that a radical anti-Ukrainian position more often encounters public opposition and no longer remains unchallenged in digital discussions.

6. Moderation by digital platforms

The monitored corpus showed more active application of moderation tools by platforms with regard to the most radical content.

The following were observed:

1. Removal of individual publications.
2. Removal of comments.
3. Temporary or permanent blocking of accounts.
4. Restriction of algorithmic distribution.
5. Reduced visibility of publications.
6. Responses to user complaints.

It is more accurate to speak of an increase in the observed moderation sensitivity of platforms rather than a complete or systemic elimination of anti-Ukrainian content.

For broader context, data from NASK, Poland's state research institute in the field of digital security, should be taken into account. In 2025, NASK sent platforms 46,511 reports concerning materials containing disinformation. Only 12 percent of the materials were fully removed, 68 percent underwent other forms of moderation, and 20 percent, or 9,301 materials, received no response. This data pertains to the entire category of disinformation and cannot be directly extrapolated to anti-Ukrainian content specifically; however, it shows that platforms more often restrict the distribution of materials than remove them entirely. (nask.pl)

Thus, the Analytical Center's internal observation of more active blocking of individual publications does not mean that the problem of platform moderation has been resolved at the systemic level.

7. Criminal background and dynamics of reports

According to data from the National Police Headquarters (Komenda Główna Policji) of Poland, published by Rzeczpospolita, Ukrainians filed 180 reports of probable hate crimes in the first half of 2026. This exceeds the figure for the same period of the previous year by more than 30 percent. (Rzeczpospolita)

This figure must be interpreted with methodological caution.

It refers to reports and statements, not to 180 confirmed instances of physical violence or 180 crimes established by a court.

The increase in the number of reports may simultaneously be linked to several factors:

1. An actual increase in the number of offenses.
2. Increased willingness of those affected to report to the police.
3. Growing public attention to ethnically motivated incidents.
4. More accurate recording of a possible motive of national hatred.
5. Improved awareness among victims of the legal mechanisms available to them.

Therefore, a statement that violence increased by 30 percent is statistically incorrect. What is confirmed is an increase of more than 30 percent in the number of reports of probable hate crimes.

A fuller assessment would require additional indicators:

1. The number of criminal proceedings opened.
2. The number of charges brought.
3. The number of cases referred to court.
4. The number of convictions.
5. The legal classification of each incident.
6. The share of physical violence among all registered episodes.
7. The average duration of investigations.

8. Response of the police and the prosecutor's office

Documented cases indicate comparatively high responsiveness by law enforcement authorities in certain high-profile cases.

On July 13, 2026, at 9:09 a.m., the prosecutor's office received a report of the insulting of two eleven-year-old Ukrainian citizens on a city bus in Bielsko-Biała. The police simultaneously initiated procedural actions, seized the recording from the bus's camera, and began identifying the victims. The suspect was detained at 10:15 a.m., i.e., approximately one hour after the official receipt of the report. An investigation was opened under Article 257 of the Polish Criminal Code, which concerns public insult on the grounds of national affiliation. (Gov.pl)

In another case in July, in Legnica, police identified and detained a 26-year-old woman following an attack on two minor Ukrainian girls. Law enforcement authorities collected video recordings, identified witnesses, and built an evidentiary case. The suspect was charged, placed under police supervision, and a restraining order was imposed prohibiting her from approaching the victims and the scene of the incident. (Komenda Miejska Policji w Legnicy)

These cases indicate heightened institutional sensitivity to incidents involving a possible ethnic motive.

Since February 2026, investigations of bias-motivated crimes have been concentrated in specialized units. Approximately 100 prosecutors have been assigned to this category of cases, working across 49 district prosecutor's offices and in a specialized unit of the District Prosecutor's Office in Warsaw. Additional training is planned in forensic computer science, psychology, extremism, and linguistics. (Gov.pl)

This decision constitutes institutional specialization of criminal prosecution. It may improve the quality of the legal classification of cases and reduce the likelihood that a national or ethnic motive is overlooked.

However, nationwide statistics on the average police response time in cases where the victims are Ukrainians are not publicly available. Therefore, on the basis of individual prompt detentions, it cannot be claimed that the police response is equally fast in all regions and in all similar cases.

The correct conclusion is that the increase in the number of reports is accompanied by a more visible, specialized, and publicly articulated response from the police and the prosecutor's office.

9. Institutional and political rhetoric

In July 2026, public statements by certain representatives of Polish authorities showed more prominent socio-economic argumentation in favor of Ukrainians.

Instead of an exclusively humanitarian framework, a model of functional contribution is increasingly applied.

In this model, Ukrainians are viewed as:

1. Participants in the Polish labor market.
2. Taxpayers.
3. Contributors to social and pension insurance.
4. Consumers of goods and services.
5. Workers in sectors experiencing labor shortages.
6. A factor of resilience for the Polish economy and social insurance system.

In a video published by TVP Info, Agnieszka Dziemianowicz-Bąk, Minister of Family, Labour, and Social Policy, stated that a sudden mass departure of Ukrainians would be a serious blow to the Polish economy. She also referred to a Ukrainian employment rate of over 70 percent and to estimates according to which every zloty of social support returns to the Polish economy and budget fourfold. (Facebook)

The latter figure should be presented specifically as a statement by the minister referencing available estimates. The TVP Info publication does not specify the name of the study, the calculation period, or the econometric methodology applied, so the fourfold-return coefficient cannot be independently verified from this source.

Nevertheless, the institutional rhetoric itself carries analytical significance. It shifts the discussion from a framework of social burden to one of economic participation and interdependence.

This can be defined as a change in framing, that is, a change in the way a social group is publicly represented.

Instead of a model of aid recipients, a model of economic participants is being formed, without whom certain sectors and elements of the social system could face labor shortages and reduced revenues.

In parallel, representatives of Polish authorities have begun to condemn hate crimes more directly. Following the attack in Bielsko-Biała, Minister of the Interior Marcin Kierwiński stated the need for a firm police response and zero tolerance for manifestations of hatred. Minister of Education Barbara Nowacka also issued a condemnation. (Tsenzor.NET) (Rzeczpospolita)

Thus, the protection of Ukrainians is increasingly framed through three institutional categories:

1. The rule of law.
2. Poland's economic interest.
3. The stability of the labor market and social systems.

10. Socio-business background

Political tension between Poland and Ukraine has not yet led to a systemic rupture of economic ties.

According to representatives of the Polish-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce, Poland remains Ukraine's second-largest trading partner after China, while Ukraine is the seventh destination for Polish exports.

Ukraine's share of Polish exports increased from 1.5 percent in 2021 to 3.5 percent. More than 90,000 Ukrainian sole proprietors are registered in Poland, along with several tens of thousands of companies established with Ukrainian capital participation. (Tsenzor.NET)

More than 600 Polish companies continue to operate in Ukraine. The volume of Polish exports to Ukraine grew from 6.3 billion euros in 2021 to 15 billion euros in 2025. In the first four months of 2026, exports increased by a further 11.8 percent.

The following were presented at the June conference on the recovery of Ukraine:

1. Guarantees from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) worth 100 million euros for Kredobank.
2. A memorandum between the Polish defense group PGZ and a Ukrainian company on expanding the production of unmanned aerial vehicles.
3. An investment agreement by the logistics operator Rohlig SUUS worth 30 million euros.

A representative of the Polish-Ukrainian Chamber of Commerce did not name any specific contract terminated directly as a result of the current political tension. However, some of the new investment initiatives previously under discussion have been postponed due to increased uncertainty.

From an analytical standpoint, the main economic effect of the tension is manifested not in the reduction of already existing operations, but in the growth of transactional and investment uncertainty.

This may be expressed in the following forms:

1. Deferral of decisions on new investments.
2. Shortening of the business planning horizon.
3. Increase in the political risk premium.
4. Phased project financing instead of a one-time investment.
5. More intensive legal due diligence of contracts.
6. Rerouting of part of logistics routes.
7. Higher requirements for insurance against war and political risks.
8. Increased caution among banks and investment organizations.

Consequently, the current political tension affects business expectations and plans more strongly than already established trade flows.

Business relations demonstrate operational resilience, but at the same time strategic predictability is declining.

11. Summary analytical assessment

The monitoring results show a divergence between several levels of social reality.

At the information level, a relative decline in the intensity of open anti-Ukrainian aggression is observed.

At the level of societal reaction, counter-speech and public condemnation of discriminatory behavior are intensifying.

At the platform level, the visibility of moderation actions is increasing, but their effectiveness remains uneven.

At the institutional level, Ukrainians are increasingly represented as an economically significant part of Polish society.

At the criminal level, the number of registered reports of probable hate crimes continues to grow.

At the law enforcement level, specialization within the prosecutor's office and prompt responses in certain high-profile cases are observed.

At the business level, a high degree of economic interdependence persists alongside growing political and investment uncertainty.

This means that information-level de-escalation is not yet accompanied by an unambiguous decline across all risk categories.

The current dynamic is asymmetric in character:

1. Discursive tension is partially declining.
2. Public counter-mobilization is intensifying.
3. The institutional response is becoming more visible.
4. The risk of individual acts of aggression persists.
5. Economic relations remain resilient.
6. Long-term investment confidence is weakening.

12. Conclusion

In July 2026, a cautiously positive but unstable trend took shape in the Polish-language information space.

Open anti-Ukrainian aggression became less dominant in the monitored corpus. At the same time, the volume of publications in which Polish users condemn xenophobia, ethnic stigmatization, and violence against Ukrainians increased.

Institutional argumentation linking the presence of Ukrainians to the resilience of the labor market, tax revenues, the pension system, and Poland's economic growth became more visible.

Business indicators do not confirm a systemic breakdown of Polish-Ukrainian economic ties. However, political tension is increasing uncertainty and may constrain future investment even while current contracts are maintained.

The growth in the number of reports of probable hate crimes shows that a decline in the visibility of aggressive content does not automatically mean an improvement in the physical safety of Ukrainians.

The current shift cannot be regarded as long-term, stable, or irreversible.

It depends on the political climate, the character of the media agenda, the activity of radical groups, the effectiveness of platform moderation, the economic situation, and the consistency of the response by state institutions.

At this stage, the most accurate assessment of the situation is one of limited discursive de-escalation and strengthening institutional counter-response, alongside the persistence of structural social, criminal, and political risks.